include so-called "pedigree" criteria for those forms of law emanating from social institutions, such as legislatures, court chambers, and custom, as well as substantive moral and political criteria. In the example above, the pedigree criteria will refer to the authority of the judge whose decision is at question: on the basis of what set of rules or institutional norms is she authorized to make legal judgments? The moral and political criteria, by contrast, will make the legality of the decision turn either directly on its substantive merits as a matter of political morality, or indirectly, on the moral merits of the lawmaker. But, and this is the key point, those moral and political criteria can only be deployed through propositions of law whose truth depends on social facts.
Let me explain. Even if a natural law view validates as law some propositions that satisfy only moral and political criteria -for example, background principles of justice such as "no one should be judge in his own cause"
1 --such principles can only be effective as law in virtue of what I will call their "social instantiation." This is true in at least three ways. First, the very terms of such background principles -what is a "cause", a "judge"? -only have determinate semantic content in relation to the particular social institutions to which they refer. 2 I don't mean to imply that their content is exhausted by actually existing institutional structures, for there can be questions whether, for example, a matter for a court counts as a "case" -questions that cannot simply be answered ostensively. But actual institutions will supply something like a focal meaning for the term. I return to these semantic issues below.
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propositions making use of those properties must relate them to entities and institutions in our social world. Otherwise, such principles are not propositions of law, but simply expressions of value.
Second, even on a natural law view, the criteria of legality are necessarily instantiated in the community's adjudicative institutions. This point is explicit in Ronald Dworkin's version of natural law, in which normative criteria are derived from a constructive interpretation of political institutions. 3 But even on a traditional view, the tests for law are deployed (or deployable) by the institutions charged with its determination. This is not meant to be a controversial claim, but simply flows from the observation that "legal system" is a success-term: to describe something as "a legal system" is to presuppose some set of institutions capable of determining what the elements of that system are. The institutions may be highly imperfect, generating both false negatives and positives, for any proposition tested. But there must be some sense in which the legality criteria, normative and pedigree alike, are deployed by those institutions, else we are not talking about a legal system at all, but only a fantasy of one.
Third, and relatedly, there is a necessarily social dimension to the application of any legal system's criteria of legality, for they are mediated through processes of reason essentially embodied in social agents. It is, I take it, a widely accepted lesson of Legal Realism that legal argument is not simply a matter of deductive reasoning. And it is (or should be) a widely accepted lesson of post-Realist jurisprudence that legal reason is not exhausted by deductive 3 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), ch. 2. Cerbone, "Don't look but think: imaginary scenarios in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
(philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein)," Inquiry 37 (1994):159-184. 6 the putative legal norms they assess. On a natural law view, social instantiation is a necessary condition of the authoritative status of legality criteria, just because social instantiation is a necessary condition of the functional existence of those criteria. But those criteria are only adequate to the task of determining law if they (or some subset) incorporate moral criteria as well. The moral constraint on the criteria of legality is not a product of their social instantiation;
it follows, rather, from the concept of law. The source of those criteria's authority is independent of their social instantiation.
Natural law theories insist that the judges only have reason to apply the criteria they do because of those criteria test for moral merit in the underlying law. Positivist views are distinguished by the claim that social instantiation, understood at least partly in terms of behavioral regularities, is both necessary and sufficient for the authority of the community's legal criteria -to their claim to be the criteria of what counts as law. To the question, "why are these the marks of legality?," it is a sufficient answer that "that's how we do things around here."
A principal challenge for positivism, as Jules Coleman has laid out in his new book, The Practice of Principle, is to show how that can be a sufficient answer. 6 How can what we in fact happen to do around here be a reason for us to keep doing it? An imitative disposition may be reasonable, or it may be pathological -a compulsion to repeat. If law is in some sense a rational activity, then the dispositions in which it is grounded had better lie in the former camp. Positivism needs to show why. 22 This is to neglect Kent Greenawalt's point that, strictly construed, the rule of recognition for the federal system therefore consists of the amending clause of the Constitution, since the rule of 14 What of philosophical use emerges from the studies of judicial politics? One point that should be resisted, I think, is the purely skeptical reading of the legal process, even though that is a clear lesson of the more reductionist literature. We must recognize that legal deliberation is thoroughly political, and that ideological conviction and strategic calculation play a great part in explaining behavior. But we can recognize this without eliminating law as a mediating set of reasons, a grammar through which this particular dialect of politics is spoken, as well as a framework which makes available certain choices and not others.
The lesson to take away is more modest: the norms governing judicial behavior, especially judicial collegiality, are not conceptually fixed, but are rather historically-specific products of interpersonal relations, particular leaders, and relations to other political actors and institutions, notably the legislature. Judicial behavior ranges from the extremely collegial to the strategic to autarkic. To put the point as charitably as possible, as an actual social process, judicial behavior seems better explained as an attempt to further individual substantive views of the good in a complex strategic environment, than as an attempt to reflect some prior agreement.
A secondary task may follow, of effectuating the right decision within the institutional framework, by persuading or bargaining with other judges. But that is secondary, consequent upon the project of considering the matter aright.
recognition is also, according to Hart, the supreme criterion of law. But this point depends on how to extract propositional content (the content of the rule) from a range of behavior. There is always a problem of characterizing behavior in terms of a rule, even behavior of a heretofore thoroughly consistent sort; this is the problem of rule-underdetermination made prominent by 23 Hart, CL, 86ff. So if disagreement is in fact pervasive, the problem for Hart's account is real.
I will deal with the obscurity first, deferring discussion of the difficulties till later in the paper, when we will be able to avoid them instead of having to solve them. Participation in a social convention is, on Hart's view, sufficient for its own warrant. But how can engaging in a practice be a reason to engage in that practice? 27 The central point for understanding Hart is to see that the "internal point of view" names not a belief about what one should do, but a complex motivational state, a state consisting in part in beliefs about the desirability of the practice, but also pro-attitudes towards the practice, and dispositions to act on those attitudes and beliefs, both positively (conformity) and negatively (critically). 28 "Accepting" a practice, in this sense, is 27 For this statement of the problem, and a discussion of the solution, see Coleman, Practice of Principle, ch..7. 28 In the jargon of philosophy of mind, the "internal point of view" has in part a world-to-mind direction of fit, unlike belief which has a mind-to-world direction of fit.
closely analogous to forming an intention, a state whose reason-generating powers are evident.
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Take the case of intention: casting about for a way to spend the evening, I decide, and so form the intention, to go to the movies. It being a weekend night, I now have reason to check the schedule, make sure there's gas in the car, buy tickets ahead, and so forth. None of these are reasons I had prior to or independently of forming the intention. Nor do any of these reasons count in support of my forming the intention in the first place. My reasons for that rest with my interest in amusement, the fact that I have no competing obligations, etc. Indeed, it may be that I have overall reason not to decide to go to the movies. What matters here is simply the observation that forming the intention structures my deliberation and motivation such that I now have reason to perform those acts constitutive of fulfilling my aim.
Similarly in the case of conventions: we must distinguish someone's reason for accepting the rule from the reasons accepting the convention provides one with. In many cases accepting a rule is not a matter of decision. It may be, as with social norms, a matter of inculcationdiscipline, in the Foucauldian sense. Alternatively, accepting a rule may be a deliberative or non-deliberative consequence of forming an intention or taking on a goal, as when one accepts the conventions of a genre in trying to produce an art work of a certain sort, or when one selects a set of rules to govern one's conduct in a game for which alternative rule-sets exist. Whatever the etiology of the rule's acceptance, its acceptance makes true claims about the reasons the agent has.
Nor should there be a problem in understanding conventional practices as generating not just reasons but duties. The crucial point is that the relevant sense of duty here is not that of an overriding moral obligation, but rather a category of reason that, within its domain, is mandatory rather than permissive, such that an agent may be subject to criticism for not acting on its basis.
Certain sorts of conventions are defined by mandatory practices; to accept the convention is to accept that the practice is something one may be criticized for not doing. Games are the standard examples: to play chess is to make true claims that one must not move rooks diagonally, that one can only move pawns one square at a time, etc. The "musts" and "oughts" of the game masquerade as categorical imperatives, but that is only because the antecedent "if one is to play the game" is presupposed. 30 The situation is more complicated, as is well known, for social norms, where it may be hard to identify an antecedent "if" that an agent might voluntarily accept Understanding the normativity of legality as a consequence of acceptance precisely makes room for that ambivalence. Dworkin's proffered alternative of an independent "consensus of conviction," according to which the reason to tip one's hat is that one really does have an independent moral duty to hattip. 32 Clearly there must be room for reasonable but unreflective conformity to account for some social norms. 33 The trouble is that judicial conformity is not like that, at least in core instances.
To take a central case, U.S. judges do not accept the status of the Constitution simply because it is comme il faut. Rather, they accept the Constitution in virtue of seeing reason to do so. Its Coleman, is that Lewis conventions exist only in a restricted domain, when all participants prefer conformity in a rule to any particular rule. 37 But it is antecedently unlikely that this distribution of preferences actually characterizes the judicial community, many of whom may well prefer that a particular rule obtain to general conformity. 38 More importantly, the possibility of law should not turn on such a distribution of preferences as a conceptual matter; the condition is far too strong. Second, the form of justification available to participants in Lewis conventions covers only a small range of the types of justification characteristic of adjudication. At most it would seem to cover the behavior of inferior court judges, who justify their behavior by reference to norms issued by superior court judges. Now, it is true that the preference-structure underlying Lewis conventions should be understood counterfactually, so that a participant need not be motivated by the desire to coordinate so long as she would not have chosen otherwise if her choice did not, in fact, coordinate. Thus, a judge could opt for an individually preferred legal rule because that rule seems right, but only so long as she would reject the rule if it weren't generally followed. But that is a very meager form of deliberative autonomy, for it still requires 36 Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
37 See Coleman, Practice of Principle, 94-95 (citing Shapiro), for an explanation of this point. 38 It would, for example, be difficult to explain the behavior of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on any other basis; the frequency with which they are reversed suggests a counterconformity strategy.
that, ultimately, the judge must prefer getting along to getting it right. And this does not seem to mesh with either actual studies of judicial politics, nor with the imaginative phenomenology that forms the basis of Dworkin's critique.
Third, Lewis conventions are incompatible with the kind of systematic disagreement among participants that characterizes adjudication, and so cannot meet Dworkin's challenge.
While it is possible, as a formal matter, to identify "rule-governed disagreement over the relevant criteria" as the solution to a coordination problem, such a "solution" would be an evident practical failure. Since the very point of a Lewis convention is to eliminate disagreement over the proper rule, building disagreement into the convention would defeat the point. Hence positivism cannot explain the practice of pervasive disagreement by reference to conventions.
Any theory of law that aims at descriptive adequacy, as positivism does, had better be able to capture the non-conventional aspect of practice. While Lewis conventions may well have a significant role to play in explaining law, it would seem a mistake to build them into the center of legal theory. (ii) commitment to a joint goal, with (i) in service of (ii); and (iii) commitment to mutual support, in that each will try to make sure the others are able to perform their parts of the joint goal. Bratman's resulting analysis is complex, but the general idea is that such instances of cooperative action can be broken down into interlocking sets of individual intentions to bring about the joint goal, where each intends that the goal be realized in part through the agency of the others. The commitment to the joint goal, however, need not presuppose that the way to achieve the goal is settled; to use his example, you and I could both be committing to singing a duet together without having decided what song to sing. Thus, commitment to the joint goal is consistent with discussion and bargaining over how to achieve it.
Coleman suggests understanding the social practice constitutive of the rule of recognition as a Bratman-type shared cooperative activity (SCA). This conception, he thinks, helps us account for the way in which judicial practice is genuinely collective without presupposing an absolute preference for coordination, as with Lewis, as well as accommodating the kind of disagreement and bargaining that presents a problem for both Hart and Lewis. Moreover, conceiving the rule of recognition as an SCA can explain the rule's normativity, for the reciprocal expectations and reliance proceeding from the commitment to mutual support generate duties owed towards the other participants. that we will walk together, but with no commitment to stay the course; we each might peel off at any time without apology. So long as each of us pursues the walk together, each will try to match the other's stride, turning as the other turns. If we do so, we will genuinely be walking together. But neither need be committed to slowing down for the other's sake, so that we can finish the walk together. Neither of us, in other words, need treat the other as a source of reason nor ground of obligation; we can treat the other instrumentally, as a means of temporary entertainment. This would, of course, be a highly unusual way to walk together, but the point is that the presence of the relevant mutual commitments is a contingent matter, not a conceptual one, at least insofar as an account of collective action goes. It may be that some collegial courts function as cooperative teams, each trying to support the efforts of the other to arrive at the correct determination of law. It is even more likely that coalitions of judges on collegial courts see their projects as cooperative, and not merely strategic.
But it surely goes too far to characterize the judiciary as a whole in cooperative terms. To repeat the point above, it is a salient feature of adjudication is that getting it right is often more important than getting together, and the SCA model doesn't make room for that degree of independence within the collective institution. To put the point another way, the SCA account is over-moralized as a description of institutionally-structured collective behavior. 44 It is a further point that the normativity generated by SCA's does not well account for the normativity possessed by the criteria of legality. For the duties generated by the SCA model are duties owed to the other participants; they are the correlates of rights of performance. But that doesn't seem to characterize the normativity of institutionally-defined criteria. If, in fact, judges do have genuine moral duties to apply some and not other criteria, those duties are owed to the beneficiaries of the institution, not to their fellow participants. 45 In any event, as I argued above, there is no reason for the positivist to search for genuine moral duties; institutionally-defined duties suffice, and those can be generated by reference to institutional roles. Cooperation need not enter the picture. 44 Surely the explanation of, say, Justice Scalia's angry dissents is not that they are his means of meeting his commitment to ensuring that his colleagues interpret the law aright. Rather, they are his means of stating what the right view is, period.
45 They may have other duties towards fellow participants, such as courtesy, but that is a separate matter.
7. So what we need is an account of collective behavior capacious enough to encompass the Scalias and the Brennans, the lone rangers and the coalition builders, an account that that makes the constitutive institutional norms matters of contingent emergence, not conceptual necessity. I am going to present such an account. But first, to put it in context, let's imagine a collegial setting with which most of us have more experience than the judicial conference room: the faculty meeting. Say that the faculty meeting is trying to decide which of two candidates to hire, each of whom does clearly strong but not perfect work, in the sense that the work is of obvious interest but has identifiable errors; and each of whom would complement the department's strengths in different ways. We can imagine at least the following deliberative scenarios taking place:
(1) Each member of the faculty speaks his or her views, doesn't listen to anyone else, Pay attention to that last sentence: "the department chooses." We ought to be more puzzled than we are, for choosing is something people do, and departments are not people (though they are made of people). And yet, unless this is the choice of the department, not just of a person or group of persons, it has no institutional significance -no authority, in a word. So how can a department choose? More abstractly, when can we attribute an act to a collective?
Two elements of the example are key: a set of rules structuring the institution, and collective action by the institutions' members. The rules of the department prescribe roles for the members to play, as interviewers, deliberators, voters, and employers; and those rules are When individuals act together in this manner, they justify claims of inclusive authorship,
claims that "we did so-and-so," when spoken by a member of the group. Such claims are inclusive because they can only be made by someone included in the group that together did something. (Contrast these with claims of exclusive authorship, claims that something is what "I have done.") Assertions of inclusive authorship are, of course, a deep and familiar part of our social life. We teachers together, in our universities, educate our students, though each of us teaches only a few students and a few courses. We together, in our departments, deliberate, vote and hire, though only some read the files, others skip the meeting, only the chair writes the offer letter. And we judges together, in our courts and chambers, distinguish the licit from the illicit, law from policy, and render judgments, though some hear trials, others reverse us, and others recuse themselves for fear of conflict. These are all things we do together, acts and events for which each can say, for better or for ill, "we did this." We do these things cooperatively, fractiously, and in various forms of hierarchical discipline and divided labor. But what makes it true that we do these things together is that each does his or her part of a collective project.
The move from "we did it" to "the department did it" should now be obvious. Thirdpersonal claims that a collective acts are parasitic on the first-personal inclusive claim -deeply parasitic in the sense that they are rooted in what Gerald Postema has nicely called "deliberation in the first person plural." 48 The department does what we do, when we are the members of the department and act with that identity in mind. Of course, our acting as members of the department -orienting our action within that institutional space -is necessary but not sufficient for the department's acting, for we might be posers. But assuming we meet the relevant criteria for being members of the department, when we vote the department chooses, and our collective choice will be authoritative, in the sense that each must recognize it as a product of our institutional voice. Here we see the importance interdependence of institutional rules and collective action: only because we satisfy the criteria of the institution does what we do count as institutional action. These criteria, moreover, are criteria both of pedigree and substantive performance. Just as someone not properly appointed could not be considered a member of the department in the formal sense, so also someone whose behavior was so out of line with institutional norms would also be excluded from the inclusive "we." ("He's not really a member of the department," we say of the madman in the attic.)
Now there is one last point to clarify before returning to the case of law. I have said that participants' conceptions of the collective goal must overlap, but that leaves matters too vague, for there is inevitably difference in individual conceptions of the collective goal, indeed debate about how to understand that goal. One member might, for example, think that our actual goal is to promote social justice by looking for a member of an underrepresented group, another that our goal is to show the dean that we are truly self-governing through exercising contentious choice, a third that we need to improve our curricular offerings in political theory. Our individual goals differ, but they overlap with respect to engaging in the hiring process, and that is sufficient to 48 Gerald Postema, "Morality in the First Person Plural," Law and Philosophy 14 (1995): 35-64. make hiring something we do together, even if fighting for social justice, etc., is not. So overlap is essentially a pragmatic concept and always a matter of degree, given inevitable differences in each agent's expectations and conceptions of the group act. Agents will have more or less determinate conceptions of the group act, they may be more or less willing to compromise after bargaining on the character of that act, and they may have very different ideas about the scope of the group act, its duration and membership. As a result, a group act can be collective under one description and not collective intentional under another.
8.
Let us return to law, and the problem for positivism of accommodating disagreement while retaining authority. This can be brief, since most of the work has already been done.
Conceiving judging as collective action shows how law can be the product of social instantiation, while making room for the kinds of disagreement, normative argument, judicial politics, and
Herculean deliberative jurisprudence that Dworkin rightly insists is part of the culture of mature legal systems.
Here is the model: a legal system consists of a set of individuals each intentionally doing his or her part in a collective project of establish a set of criteria for distinguishing those norms that have a privileged status in social ordering from other social norms, and determining the proper application of the privileged norms, plus institutions for generating and revising the privileged norms, plus some extensive set of social practices in a population governed effectively by those norms. We can without, vicious circularity, refer to the privileged norms as "legal" norms, understanding "legal" in terms of the uncontroversial social marks of governing potentially harmful behavior, channeling disputes, empowering contractors, susceptible to political change, claiming supreme authority, and so on; and we also can refer to the individuals 35 as judges, though the defense against circularity is slightly more complicated, and I will address it below. So, even more simplified, the model is this: A legal system consists of a set of judges, And it consists in an acceptance of the project of determining law under some description, be it using legal power to fight social power, or ensuring a social environment predictable enough for citizens to plan their lives, or acting as the agent of the legislature. But it need not consist wholly in acquiescence in a set of shared legal criteria, though such acquiescence may be a consequence of the unified orientation. Consider the analogy of conversation, as developed by Paul Grice.
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To engage in conversation is to accept certain linguistic conventions, as well as conventions of turn-taking, tone, and the like. And it is to accept a set of pragmatic norms, of relevance, economy, sincerity, and clarity. Sharing these norms (at least some of them) makes conversation possible; but the resulting conversation can be anything from flirtatious banter to consensusbuilding to a shouting match. Acceptance of the structural norms entails almost nothing about the nature of the conversational content.
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Before addressing the problem of normativity, let me defuse the worry of circularity in presupposing an institutional space -the courts, more or less -that serves to orient judicial behavior. The worry is that the rules constitutive of the institution and its offices are legal rules, and so must be validated by the criteria established by the "judges." But the judges are, by hypothesis, only able to establish legality criteria within the context of the constitution, and so circularity seems to be built in. There are two responses. First, as Coleman has argued, the circularity is only apparent, for the legal status of the institutional rules is not prior to the acts of the individuals who collectively establish the legality criteria. 51 In establishing the criteria of legality, they make true the claim that they hold legal offices, and that (some of) the norms But of course a political solution to the prisoner's dilemma -a monopoly on violence, for Hobbes -can be the product of a non-collective process. What sustains the monopoly is that it does solve the collective action problem, but the explanation of its emergence can look quite different.
9.
When judges do share an institutional orientation, no matter how they disagree in their decisions, their decisions count as conclusions of law, not of men. By acting collectively, judges warrant the attribution of their decisions to the institution as a whole: their decisions are decisions of law; their decisions therefore claim the authority the institution claims, and have the authority the institution deserves. The legitimating effects of the institutional attribution resonate both externally and internally to the institution. External to the institution -from the perspective of a legal subject -some judge's determination that P marks P as authoritative, as coming from a particular instantiation of authority, and so gives the subject reason to comply. And internal to the institution, the judge's decision is -from the perspective of another judge -something we 52 See Marmor, "Legal Conventionalism," 528, for a similar point.
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have done, and therefore a move in the collective project that demands response. The response may acquiescence, or it may be rejection, but a response is demanded nonetheless. Compare liability: if I am a member of a group that together causes some disaster, I owe a response to that harm, and its victims, that I would not if I were not a member. Its being our act makes a difference, even if the act was not mine. 53 Similarly, some judge's decision that P is law is now an element in how other judges must understand what they together have done; it partly defines, by modifying, how the collective project is realized.
Here is the truth in Dworkin's claim that precedents have "gravitational force" even when the rule they stand for does not apply in the instant case. As a matter of phenomenology, the explanation lies in judges' realization that the decision is for which, and to which, they are responsible, since it is, in the inclusive sense, their decision. And as a matter of jurisprudence, One consequence of this revision to positivism is that the criteria of law are no longer usefully represented in terms of a rule of recognition. Some rule-like generalizations, of course can be made -e.g., the Constitution is law, custom is law, legislative history is not law. And some of these generalizations may be supported by argumentative consensus, or by conventional acceptance. But the source of their support is a contingent feature, and the only general thing that can be said of the community's criteria of law is that, ultimately, they consist in what the judges offer as contributions to the collective project of law-determination. Any statement of a "rule" represents merely a temporary equilibrium in an ongoing collective project. Fortunately, we do not need rules to account for normativity at the foundations of law. The duties of the judges to find law come from a shared conception of the institution in which they find themselves: to accept the job is to accept the norms, mandatory and permissive both, that structure the institution, and so make one liable for deviations therefrom. And the normativity of the decisions themselves, as I have argued, consists in their being products of the collective project, and so constituting grounds for deliberative response. The criteria are not, therefore, duty-generating, but they are response-demanding, and this seems normativity enoughmoreover it is normativity whose ground is purely social. The distinction between positivism and natural law is thus preserved. Last, because inconsistent decisions need not be reconciled into a rule, this version of positivism escapes the problem of extracting a univocal, propositional rule from divergent behavior.
It also follows from this account that the criteria of legality cannot serve the function of guiding conduct as exhaustively as some positivists, as the objection to non-rule-based criteria derives from the function of law, it would seem that it could be satisfied as a matter of degree. 56 This account does permit the coalescence of legality criteria into rules, as a contingent matter. So, even if as a conceptual matter a legal system is characterized in terms of a certain, very high degree of rule-guidance with respect to the criteria of legality, it may be a contingent matter whether collective attempts at legal organization actually satisfy the success criteria. This seems intuitively correct, for a social institution characterized by nothing but disagreement over the criteria of legality could not, as a matter of practice let alone principle, perform the social ordering that is an existence condition of a legal system. On my account, law is grounded in an adjudicative community, and while that community may be fractious, that fractiousness must be understood against a background of common purpose. The mistake, however, is to build agreement into the account of normativity at the root of law, or to think that normativity can only be provided by either rules or morality.
Rather, what we do together can be a source of reasons. 
